Problem with auditing is... (The stuff dreams are made of) by Stone, Marvin L.
University of Mississippi 
eGrove 
Proceedings of the University of Kansas 
Symposium on Auditing Problems Deloitte Collection 
1-1-1972 
Problem with auditing is... (The stuff dreams are made of) 
Marvin L. Stone 
Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/dl_proceedings 
 Part of the Accounting Commons, and the Taxation Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Auditing looks ahead: Proceedings of the Touche Ross/University of Kansas Symposium on Auditing 
Problems, pp. 121-135; 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Deloitte Collection at eGrove. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Proceedings of the University of Kansas Symposium on Auditing Problems by an authorized 
administrator of eGrove. For more information, please contact egrove@olemiss.edu. 
8 
The Problem with Auditing Is . . . . 
(The Stuff Dreams Are Made of) 
Marvin L. Stone 
Stone, Gray and Company 
Most of the other papers delivered at this symposium commence with the 
word "toward," e.g., Toward Standards for Statistical Sampling, Toward Stand-
ards for Materiality, Toward a Philosophy of Auditing. Apparently our chair-
man had no wish to go "toward" further problems in auditing when he assigned 
my topic. Consequently, my talk may be described as "untoward." I have 
thought a great deal about my topic since I received the assignment—so much in 
fact, that it has found its way into my dreams. Before addressing myself formally 
to the topic, let me describe a few of those dreams. My dreams are seldom, if 
ever, in technicolor. Everything is in sharply defined black and white—no gray 
areas, as in real life. 
Dream No. 1—Independence and Fees 
The scene of dream number one is a courtroom in which Ralph Nader is 
presiding judge. As my dream commenced, I was on the witness stand and 
was being asked to describe the CPA's role. The questioner was a not-too-
friendly banker who frequently questions the CPA's independence. In all 
candor, his question was a little more pointed—something like, "What the hell 
do you auditors do, anyway?" 
Casting aside my well-known reticence to speak before an audience, I 
delivered the following carefully prepared extemporaneous remarks: 
The business community in which all of us live and work is very much 
like a giant football game. Businessmen play the game. The SEC and 
we CPAs are the officials—the only difference being that the SEC has a 
whistle, but the CPAs don't. 
The public, watching from the stands, relies on the officials to see that 
everyone plays by the rules—the same rules. The rules are written to 
permit a little deceptive ball-handling, designed to fool competitors on 
the other team, but not to prevent the spectators from determining how 
the game is going—who is gaining ground and who is losing. 
Many of the onlookers don't even know what the game is all about. They 
just came along to watch because that's what everyone else was doing. 
Everyone watching the game is entitled to know that the gains and 
losses of all the players are measured against the same yard markers. 
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They are entitled to expect that first-down measurements are all made 
with the same ten-yard chain, and that all players are battling over 36-
inch yards. Even the best binoculars don't provide an observer in the 
stands with vision equal to that of a person on the playing field. That's 
why officials are needed. 
Its the very nature of things that occasional disagreements arise between 
the players and the officials. Rule enforcers seldom win popularity con-
tests. And, of course, a few shouts from the stands of "Kil l the Ump" 
are in the best American tradition. In our case, whenever anyone sees 
an infraction which escapes the official's view, the shouts come out, 
"Where was the Auditor?" 
Like officials at other games, the officials in this game of business are 
rarely accused of dishonesty, I am happy to say. One hears an occasional 
derogatory comment about our eyesight or intelligence, but then the right 
to call an Ump blind or stupid is also part of our American Heritage. 
Once in a while a particularly incensed spectator may even question the 
legitimacy of our birth. Unpleasant as it is to hear epithets such as these, 
all of us—officials and players alike—must grin and bear it. For if the 
public didn't buy tickets to the game—i.e., if they didn't buy stock in the 
companies whose statements we audit—there would be no game. 
While many of the spectators may just come along for the ride, the 
majority have a vital stake in the outcome of the game. They have 
placed heavy bets on one team or another. It's up to the CPA to give 
those who have a stake in the game the best possible data with which 
to evaluate the teams. 
Naturally, I expected applause, or at least rapt attention interrupted peri-
odically by chuckles of amusement at the cleverness of my analogy. Instead, the 
judge and jurors exhibited an attitude of obvious skepticism as they shook their 
heads in disbelief. When I looked closer, I noted that each of the jurors was also 
a bank loan officer. In fact, it began to look like a Robert Morris Associates 
meeting. 
The examining counsel continued his questioning: 
Q. In this football game of business, Mr. Stone, how does it happen that 
each team hires its own referees? 
A. Traditionally, every firm has always had the right to engage auditors 
(and for that matter, all types of professional advisors) of its choice. 
The right was questioned during Congressional hearings which pre-
ceded passage of the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts. When a spokes-
man for the accounting profession was asked at that time who audits 
the auditors, he replied, "Our consciences." 
Q. You're supposed to be independent of your clients. Isn't that right, 
Mr. Stone? 
A. Yes, that is correct. Our code of ethics contains strong rules designed 
to insure our independence, both in appearance and in fact. 
Q. How can you be independent of the client who pays you? Doesn't 
his right to discharge you in favor of another auditor impair your 
supposed independence, both in appearance and in fact? 
A. No, not at all. We are governed not only by our consciences, but also 
by a growing body of official pronouncements which provide guide-
lines to eliminate at least part of the potential areas of disagreement. 
The possibility that some agrieved party might sue for damages un-
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doubtedly acts as an additional safeguard against the auditor's suc-
cumbing to client pressure. As you probably know, no member of 
the auditing firm may serve as an officer or director of the company 
to be audited, nor may any member own any interest whatsoever, 
either directly or indirectly. 
My questioner obviously considered my answer somewhat lame and not al-
together responsive. He continued by saying: 
Your profession seems to have taken great pains to avoid minor infringe-
ments of actual or apparent independence. For example, you can't 
audit a company if even a few of its shares are owned by the wife of 
one of your partners in Seattle or Miami because that might make it 
appear that you aren't independent. Yet you consider your independence 
unsullied by the fact that your entire relationship with the client depends 
completely on his willingness to re-engage you and to pay your fee. 
Although these comments weren't framed as a question, I took the oppor-
tunity to comment on the growing feeling that the public is really the CPA's 
client and to describe the AICPA's 1967 statement urging corporations to appoint 
audit committees composed of outside directors to nominate auditors and to re-
ceive their reports. This led to the following additional questions: 
Q. Is this AICPA statement binding on anyone? 
A. No. It's merely an advisory statement. 
Q. As a matter of fact, isn't it true that this advisory statement has had 
very little effect on publicly held companies? 
A. I believe some corporations have adopted the recommendation, but 
I don't know how many. 
Q. How would this recommendation affect the thousands of companies 
that have no "outside" directors? 
A. It would have no effect. 
Taking a somewhat different tack, the questioner asked: 
Q. Mr. Stone, a minute ago you commented that the CPA's real client 
is the public. If that is so, why are auditors' reports addressed to the 
company, its board of directors, or its stockholders? Why not "to 
whom it may concern" or simply no salutation at all? 
After pondering the question for a few moments, I was tempted to quote 
Tevye, the impoverished dairyman in "Fiddler on the Roof," who when asked 
to explain one of his people's traditions says, "You may ask, 'Why do we wear 
our little round skullcaps?' Well, I'll tell you—I don't know." 
However, since I had been billed as an expert, I felt obliged to burble a few 
ill-chosen words to the effect that the apparent inconsistency was merely evi-
dence of the dynamic nature of the accountant's world. I agreed that different 
wording might well be more consistent with the auditor's present relationship 
to the public. 
At this point, my lawyer took advantage of the rather liberal procedural 
rules which pervade my dreams and warned me in a stage whisper that eliminat-
ing the traditional salutation from the auditor's opinion could well lead to a 
further deterioration of the Ultramares doctrine which requires a greater degree 
of care by CPAs to their clients than to third parties who have no privity. Easing 
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the seeming distinction between clients and third parties could serve to ac-
celerate that trend. 
Then, in a typical display of what for want of a better term I will call "law-
yer other-handedness," he said: "But on the other hand, the Shatterproof Glass 
decision may have already buried Ultramares." Once again, I yearned for a 
one-armed lawyer. 
Having been thus forewarned (if not forearmed) by my lawyer, I turned 
my attention back to the examining counsel. He concluded his interrogation 
with one more salvo: 
Q. Mr. Stone, if, as you say, the public is your client, should not your 
pay come from the public? After all, he who pays the piper calls 
the tune. 
Before I could respond, I was dismissed and James Needham, a member 
of the Securities Exchange Commission, was called to the witness stand. 
Q. Mr. Needham, would you describe your professional qualifications. 
A. I am a Certified Public Accountant, and was engaged in the practice 
of public accounting for a number of years before appointment to 
the SEC. 
Q. Is the SEC considering the issuance of a recommendation that out-
side directors nominate the corporate auditors? 
A. Yes, the Commission is considering such a proposal. In its present 
form, the recommendation would not have the force of law. If 
adopted, it would amount to a strong nudge. 
Q. Could you tell us why the SEC is considering this move? 
A. We've become concerned about the quality of work performed by 
many accounting firms. In fact, I've suggested that accounting firms 
might find it beneficial to reevaluate their current large outlays on 
professional development in light of the actual audit performance. 
The SEC has found instances of problems relating to elementary 
disclosure, succumbing to obvious pressure by clients, faulty judg-
ments and decisions at the partnership level of the certifying account-
ing firms, and questions of independence bordering on commercial 
fraud. 
After James Needham stepped down, the examining counsel summed up 
by saying: 
When life insurance companies want to know whether they should bet 
on my survival, they don't ask me to hire a doctor—they send me to 
theirs. The same thing happens when I apply for a job and the employer 
requires a physical examination. Perhaps its time for someone other 
than the contestants to hire the referees in the game of business 
described by Mr. Stone. 
As my dream faded out, I kept hearing the song from the "King and I" in 
which the King of Siam, musing on what to tell his son and heir about women, 
and life in general, wonders aloud if he should educate him in all the ancient lies. 
Then, frustrated at the indecision fostered by his new-found modern knowledge, 
the King sings: "When my father was a king, he was a king who knew exactly 
what he knew." 
As the King says: "Is a puzzlement!" 
124 
Dream No. 2—Audited Forecasts 
The second dream I would like to tell you about again found me on the 
witness stand. This time, however, the examining counsel was a well-known 
financial analyst. His questions went something like this: 
Q. I use financial statements to help predict the future. If you insist 
on using historical costs, why don't you at least give me a projection 
for the next year or two? 
A. Management is hesitant to divulge its plans, since to do so might aid 
competitors. 
Q. Management must have prepared a budget and cash forecast. Why 
can't we see them? 
A. Management would rather not answer for differences between pre-
dicted and actual results. Not only that, unscrupulous managements 
could adjust predictions to further their own aims. Over-optimistic 
predictions could be used to generate short-range increases in stock 
prices. Overly pessimistic predictions could be made public in order 
to cause actual results to look good by comparison. From the data in 
an annual report, readers can construct their own forecasts. 
Q. What you are giving us then, is a kind of "do-it-yourself kit." That 
arrangement doesn't seem very efficient. Management and its ac-
countants have the best grasp of the pertinent facts and are most 
knowledgeable about future plans. Yet they withhold the very data 
we users need. What kind of full disclosure is that? 
Even in my somnolent condition, I recognized this as a rhetorical question to 
which no answer was expected. Counsel continued: 
Q. Do CPAs audit budgets and other forecasts? 
A. CPAs often assist clients in preparing budgets and forecasts; however, 
we don't audit them. Our ethical rules prohibit the expression of 
an opinion on forecasts. 
Q. Why the prohibition? 
A. CPAs traditionally report on data that is susceptible to objective tests. 
Forecasts are based on opinions as to future events. An evaluation of 
the likelihood of such events occurring and of their probable results 
necessarily must rely largely on subjective evidence. 
Q. You say CPAs aren't permitted to render opinions on future events. 
Isn't a historical statement full of assumptions about the future? Isn't 
your examination of receivables and the related provision for un-
collectible accounts explicitly directed toward future collectibility? 
Isn't your examination of inventories concerned primarily with future 
saleability? Isn't it true, Mr. Stone, that future recoverability of 
unamortized plant and equipment costs is one of your principal con-
cerns when examining fixed assets? Similarly, isn't future recover-
ability of primary concern when you examine capitalized research 
and development costs? 
You say that CPAs render opinions only on objectively determined 
historical costs. Frankly, it seems to me that the line between the 
past and the future is hazy indeed. In fact, Mr. Stone, isn't it true 
that the "going concern" concept which underlies the financial state-
ments of every business entity is, in effect, an implied opinion as 
to the future? 
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Suppressing a mischievous desire to ask that the question be repeated, I again 
assumed the question to be rhetorical. Mistaking my silence as a sign of tacit 
agreement (or at least the absence of any objection) my interrogator continued: 
Q. We only consult history to shed some light on the future. Since 
auditing purports to be a utilitarian art not an academic exercise, 
why do CPAs audit history but not budgets? 
My recollection of how this dream ended is somewhat hazy. I recall ex-
amining counsel repeating the last question over and over with ever-increasing 
insistence. I remember wondering why my lawyer failed to come to my aid by 
objecting to the questioner's haranguing and argumentative line of inquiry, until 
I noticed that the presiding judge was one Lewis Gilbert. 
Should any of you wonder how this dream sequence ends, a midnight snack 
consisting of a liverwurst and smoked oyster sandwich on rye and a bottle of 
beer will produce an instant replay—at least, that's what induced the original. 
Dream No. 3—Management Advisory Services and Independence 
I seem to have tuned in late on the next Dream, so I didn't catch the ques-
tioner's name. As the dream opened, I was again on the witness stand and 
questioning was already underway. This time, the questioner was speaking in 
a pleasant, disarming way, with a hint of New York in his voice. He was hum-
ming a tune that I couldn't quite place. His questions began: 
Q. Mr. Stone, you were saying that audits often result in recommenda-
tions to the client. 
A. Yes. Most CPAs consider the suggestions for improvement of a 
client's operations the most important result of an audit—certainly 
the most tangible. 
Q. Are CPAs often engaged to render management advisory services 
as a result of the recommendations contained in the so-called man-
agement letter? 
A. That depends somewhat on the nature of the CPA's expertise and 
his ability to convince the client that consulting services are needed 
and that the CPA is the most logical supplier of those services. In 
many instances, CPAs are engaged to render the services recom-
mended in a management letter. 
Examining counsel continued in a friendly vein: 
Q. Could you give us some examples of these services? 
A. CPAs are often engaged to improve a client's accounting system or 
even to install a completely new system. We advise clients how 
taxes may be reduced by choosing the most beneficial accounting 
methods for such items as depreciation and inventory valuation. We 
occasionally assist clients in revising their financial structure to im-
prove working capital or to facilitate expansion. Clients sometimes 
need help in deciding to buy or lease needed equipment or real 
estate. CPAs can be useful in that area as well. 
Q. Aren't you being too modest, Mr. Stone? I've read that CPAs con-
tribute to client profitability. I've heard them described as a vital 
part of the management team. Don't CPAs often play an important 
role in merger, sale and acquisition negotiations? 
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I cast my eyes downward, blushing slightly, and kicked my foot to the side 
diffidently as I uttered some modest phrase like, "Aw shucks." Then I proceeded 
to describe in some detail a few of the more imaginative consulting services I 
have performed during my professional career. I must confess that even the 
retelling itself became somewhat imaginative as I warmed to the task. I was 
feeling positively eloquent by the time I finished. 
The euphoria into which I lapsed was interrupted by my questioner. With a 
sardonic smile on his lips and a somewhat more insistent tone in his voice he 
asked: 
Q. After performing these many and varied services for your clients, 
Mr. Stone, are you still independent to report to the public? Can you 
look objectively at the outcome of a transaction you helped structure? 
Can you judge the fairness of data accumulated by a system you 
designed? 
Jolted out of my blissful state, I started to collect my thoughts in order to 
frame a response. The judge, Malcolm Devore, gave me a short respite as he 
leaned down from the bench to remonstrate my questioner: "One question at 
a time, Professor Briloff, one question at a time." As I heard my questioner's 
name, I suddenly remembered the name of the tune he was humming. It came 
from "The Mikado" by Gilbert and Sullivan and is called, "I Am the Lord 
High Executioner." 
Having regained my composure, I delivered the profession's traditional 
response: 
A. In consulting engagements, CPAs merely advise; decisions are made 
by the client. 
Judge Malcolm Devore listened with obvious sympathy to my reply, but 
Professor Briloff was so busy conferring with his co-counsel, Professor Schulte, 
that he didn't seem to be paying much attention to my answer. The moment I 
finished, Professor Briloff was back on his feet asking: 
Q. Shouldn't a CPA insure his independence, both in fact and in ap-
pearance, by refusing to perform consulting services for audit clients? 
I responded with the "party line": 
A. Any such policy would deprive the client of advice from the person 
best qualified to give it. Forcing the client to engage a multitude of 
advisors spreads responsibility and diminishes efficiency. 
In rebuttal, Professor Briloff commented, "Mr. Stone, your response sounds 
like an indictment of a separation-of-duties doctrine which is the very corner-
stone of every system of internal control." 
I was delighted that the judge relieved me of the obligation to reply by ruling 
Briloff's comments out of order. As the dream ended, the jury foreman (who also 
turned out to be Malcolm Devore) was applauding Judge Devore's decision. 
Dream No. 4—General Acceptance vs. Fairness 
I will recount just one more dream before getting to the subject of my talk. 
This dream opened in a courtroom where the bailiff was intoning the familiar, 
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"Hear ye, hear ye, this court is now in session in the case of General Acceptance 
vs. Fairness, Judge Henry J . Friendly presiding." Again, I found myself on the 
witness stand. After the usual preliminaries establishing my professional qualifica-
tions, the examining counsel, Wilma Soss, proceeded as follows: 
Q. Mr. Stone, the standard opinion rendered by CPAs contains the 
phrase, "generally accepted accounting principles." Could you tell 
the court by whom these accounting principles have been generally 
accepted? 
A. By preparers, users and auditors of financial statements. 
Q. How do CPAs learn of this "general acceptance"? Does some or-
ganization take a periodic poll? 
A. The Accounting Principles Board, an arm of the American Institute 
of CPAs, surveys accounting practices on a continuous basis. As a 
result of this surveillance and an extensive program of research, the 
APB issues opinions from time to time. Among other things, these 
opinions delineate which accounting principles are acceptable and 
which are not. 
Q. Has the APB issued opinions on all or substantially all of the prin-
ciples which underlie financial statements? 
A. No, the body of principles is large and continues to grow as condi-
tions change. Consequently, the APB, its predecessor, The Commit-
tee on Accounting Procedure, and the Financial Accounting Stand-
ards Board which will soon replace it could never hope to finish 
the task. The APB and its predecessor have tried to devote their 
resources to those areas most in need of attention. 
Q. I understand that alternative means have evolved to portray various 
segments of accounting data. When that occurs, Mr. Stone, which 
alternative gets the APB's blessing—the method with the most 
followers? 
A. Not necessarily. While the APB has attempted to narrow and reduce 
differences, you should understand that several alternative account-
ing methods may be considered generally accepted in a given situa-
tion, even though they may arrive at different results. 
Q. When several acceptable accounting methods are available, which 
method does the accountant use in a given situation? 
A. Hopefully, the one which results in the fairest presentation of the 
facts. 
Q. Aha! You said "fairest presentation." That's the first time that you 
have said anything about fairness. 
A. Fairness is the ultimate aim of all the APB's efforts. General accep-
tance is merely a means to that end. 
Q. Isn't it true, Mr. Stone, that some of the accounting methods in gen-
eral use fall somewhat short of the fairness standard you describe? 
A. I suppose so. However, the APB is trying to weed out the inferior 
methods. 
Q. A moment ago, Mr. Stone, you said that "hopefully" an accountant 
will use the accounting method which results in the fairest presenta-
tion. Isn't the auditor required to insist on the fairest alternative 
before he expresses an opinion? 
A. No, there is no such requirement at present. However, CPAs often 
exert their influence in favor of the superior method. Perhaps some 
day the use not only of generally accepted accounting principles but 
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also of the most desirable GAAP will be required before an auditor 
renders an opinion on financial statements. 
Q. On the subject of the auditor's opinion, Mr. Stone, the standard lan-
guage somewhat confuses me. You CPAs say that statements "fairly 
present . . . in conformity with GAAP." That phrase could have 
several meanings. It could mean: 
a. The statements are both fair and in conformity with GAAP. 
b. The statements are fair because they are in conformity with GAAP. 
c. The statements are fair only to the extent that GAAP are fair. 
A. Your confusion is understandable. A special AICPA committee 
Which of these meanings does the CPA intend? 
urged some years ago that terms such as "present fairly" and "GAAP" 
be defined. A survey by Professor Briloff of selected members of 
the accounting profession and of the financial community showed 
support for each of the interpretations you mentioned and a few 
others as well. AICPA literature appears to take the second approach, 
i.e., "present fairly" is modified by the "conformity" portion of the 
full phrase. 
A fair presentation is to be understood within the framework 
of GAAP, much as the behavior of football players is to be under-
stood as "fair" within the framework of the rules of football. Just as 
what is fair in football may not be considered fair in other forms 
of social activity, meeting tests of fairness within the framework of 
GAAP does not guarantee meeting such tests from the standpoint 
of users of financial statements. This interpretation of the phrase 
might be called the "ground rules" theory.* 
Q. Does the "ground rules" approach have the widest support among 
the members of the accounting profession and the financial com-
munity? 
A. No, the Briloff survey showed a preference for the first interpreta-
tion. This is an understandable reaction from the financial commu-
nity, but a somewhat surprising reaction from CPAs since it is the 
least favorable from the legal liability standpoint. Incidentally, for 
some years, Arthur Andersen & Co. worded its opinions: "Present 
fairly . . . and were prepared in conformity with generally accepted 
accounting principles," which also infers a meaning similar to the 
first interpretation. 
Q. With so much disagreement among CPAs themselves as to the 
meaning of key words in the standard opinion, is it any wonder 
that people outside the accounting profession don't know what an 
auditor's opinion means? 
A. The accounting profession has worked long and hard to improve 
communication with the public. The profession unquestionably still 
has a long way to go. Since fair presentation of data is clearly the ac-
countant's major goal, it may well be that the term, GAAP, will 
prove to be a mere way-station in the evolution of the auditor's 
opinion. The term may well disappear in time, taking with it many 
questions of semantics which now bedevil writers and readers of 
CPA opinions. Should this come to pass, the issues raised in this 
dispute between "general acceptance" and "fairness" will become 
moot. 
* See " 'Present Fairly' and Generally Accepted Accounting Principles," Geraldine F. 
Dominiak and Joseph G. Louderback III, The CPA Journal, January, 1972, pp. 45-49. 
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I quickly learned how the judge felt about the matter when he instructed 
the jury that the critical test in determining if financial statements are false or 
misleading is whether they fairly present financial position, not whether they 
conform with GAAP. Before a decision was reached, the trial was interrupted 
by the clarion call of my alarm clock, arousing me to another day of toil in the 
vineyards of public enlightenment. 
Unfortunately, problems with auditing don't stop when I awaken. Here 
then are a few more of the problems with which auditors must wrestle, awake 
or asleep. 
Need for a Better Defined Philosophy of Auditing 
Some years ago, Mautz and Sharaf published an excellent monograph on 
the philosophy of auditing, a subject on which Bob Mautz will further expound 
tomorrow. While this work is a good start, I am certain that the authors did not 
intend their pioneering efforts as a final word on the subject. 
Neither auditors nor their clients seem to have a clearcut understanding of 
the auditor's role. In the area of fraud detection, for example, this uncertainty 
is evidenced by the fact that many audit procedures seem designed almost entirely 
to detect defalcations even though auditors continue to deny any responsibility 
for fraud detection. For many years, the public ascribed occult powers to auditors. 
Auditors were generally believed to possess near-magical powers to ferret out 
misdeeds merely by passing their hands over a set of books. Although auditors 
knew full well that no such magical powers existed, they somewhat enjoyed the 
effects of these widely held misconceptions and did little to dispel the mystique. 
Ony recently, have auditors—prompted by a rash of lawsuits—attempted to 
bring their public image into better focus. 
The trueblood Committee's findings (re: the objectives of financial state-
ments) could be a prelude to a similar study of audit objectives. Such a study 
might well provide a better exposition of just what an audit is, for whom it is 
performed, etc. 
Need to Recognize Auditing as a Discipline Separate from Accounting 
Since CPAs have traditionally audited financial statements, the line between 
accounting and auditing is not at all clear. This haziness is further enhanced 
by the fact that our reports are traditionally expressed in accounting terms. The 
need for a better delineation of auditing as a separate discipline is becoming more 
apparent as CPAs are called upon with greater frequency to audit non-financial 
data and management performance. 
The fuzziness of the line between accounting and auditing has been par-
ticularly evident in the protracted attempts to re-word the short form auditor's 
opinion. Part of the difficulty may, of course, be attributed to a natural reluctance 
to change. However, the main problem lies in the lack of a theoretical under-
pinning for the entire field of auditing. Without basic theory, it's no surprise 
that audit procedures are in a rudimentary stage of development. Drawing in-
ferences from a sample has long been a major technique of auditors. Yet the 
use of scientific sampling methods to insure validity and permit establishment 
of confidence levels is only recently making headway among auditors. Many 
CPAs still view statistical sampling as "organized superstition." 
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For auditing to come into its own, it must be severed from accounting and 
stand on its own theoretical feet. This move is particularly important if CPAs 
expect to be acknowledged as auditors of non-financial data, an important de-
velopment in my opinion. 
By way of example, the decennial census provides data upon which a great 
many people rely. The census, then, is an obvious candidate for independent 
audit. Were a CPA to undertake such an engagement, he would quickly find 
just how intertwined accounting and auditing really are. Few of his questions 
concerning theory, procedure, or form of report would be answered by any of 
the present auditing literature. 
Need for Current Value Reporting 
Without reiterating the current value arguments which were presented at 
the 1970 Kansas University symposium, historical cost creates problems for 
auditors, too. The auditor's function is to add credibility. No amount of auditing 
can make incredible statements credible. To most readers, I fear that the implica-
tions of historical cost statements are just that—incredible (and unintelligible, 
to boot). 
My firm audits a company which made a sizable investment in two parcels 
of land ten years ago. Last year, the value of one of these parcels dropped sub-
stantially below cost. The write-down converted the company's already meager 
earnings to a loss, causing a stockholder to dispose of his stock. 
The following year, the company sold its other parcel of ground at a gain 
which exceeded earnings for the last ten years combined. What do I tell the 
selling stockholder when he asks such questions as: 
Did the company really make all that money in one year? If not, how 
come the last nine years showed so little gain and even a loss last year 
when the other parcel was written down to market value? 
How credible did my audit make those financial statements? 
Financial Statements Give Erroneous Impression of Precision 
The language and dollar amounts which appear in financial statements con-
vey a much greater degree of precision than can be justified. In many respects, 
the accountant acts like the head linesman in a football game. After unpiling 
fifteen or twenty players, the referee places the ball approximately where he feels 
it belongs. Then the head linesman runs in with the chains to see whether the 
ball is one inch short or two inches beyond the first down line. So it is with 
accountants. After approximating the amount of receivables which will be col-
lected, the resulting estimate is shown as $614,319.23. Nowhere is the reader 
put on notice that the accountant is only 95% certain that the receivables total 
10% more or less than $614,319.23. If that is the degree of the accountant's cer-
tainty, shouldn't the financial statements say so? 
By stating earnings per share as an absolute amount of dollars and cents, 
that commonly used index is invested with a much greater degree of precision 
than any knowledgeable insider intends. Might not this aura of precision be 
laid to rest if earnings per share were stated as a range rather than as an 
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absolute amount? The use of a range might also lessen the impression of absolute 
accuracy which readers now obtain from financial statements. 
Need for Audit Research 
Until recently, there has been virtually no research as to the effectiveness of 
audit procedures, reflecting auditing's general position as the accounting pro-
fession's poor relation. While vast sums have been committed to accounting 
research and the work of the APB, only meager resources have been committed 
to auditing. Except for statistical sampling, audit procedures have largely been 
developed by doing rather than by empirical research. 
It's time to subject generally used audit procedures to critical examination. 
Just how effective are receivable confirmations, inventory observations, etc.? 
The accounting profession might well take a hard look at what went wrong 
when companies with robust statements, recently audited, suddenly go bankrupt. 
For example, if receivables turn out to be non-existent, perhaps CPAs should 
rethink the audit procedures which failed to uncover the problem. Perhaps 
research might uncover better audit procedures. 
None of these comments should be interpreted as criticism of the recent 
revival of the Committee on Auditing Procedure. That committee's present 
schedule could hardly be called "too little" even though it certainly came 
much "too late." 
Accountants' Financial Responsibility 
There seems to be a growing interest in the CPA's financial resources. Dur-
ing a recent meeting, a banker put it quite succinctly. He asked: "You say that 
CPAs are unlimitedly liable for their work. What assurance does that give a 
financial statement user? Are CPAs bonded? Is there any place we can deter-
mine the extent of a CPA's assets or insurance?" 
It is inevitable that the SEC will soon be asking similar questions. A sugges-
tion, heard infrequently in the past, that CPAs publish their own financial state-
ments, was recently repeated by John Burton, newly appointed Chief Accountant 
of the SEC. The size of an audit fee vis-a-vis the CPA's total income or resources 
could well bear on the question of the CPA's independence. 
Shortly after World War 1, so the story goes, the King of England sought 
advice concerning his country's perilous financial condition. A consultant sup-
posedly advised him to put India in his wife's name. The uncertainties of public 
accounting and the soaring cost of liability insurance have prompted many 
CPAs to take a similar route. Acceleration of this trend could serve to accentuate 
the public's concern over the CPA's financial responsibility. 
Perhaps the public's new-found concern over the accounting profession is 
a sign that we have arrived. At least now we are noticed. The CPA's increased 
prominence brings to mind the old story of a man who, having been tarred 
and feathered, was being ridden out of town on a rail. When he was asked 
how he felt about his predicament, he replied: "If it weren't for the honor, I'd 
rather walk." 
Reporting Requirements Burdensome to Small Business 
Although most reporting requirements are equally valid for both large and 
small companies, a few rules are obviously geared to the needs of publicly held 
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companies. At present, reporting requirements apply equally to companies of all 
sizes. Complying with certain of the reporting requirements (e.g., reporting 
earnings per share) can sometimes prove burdensome to a closely held company 
—a burden which produces meaningless data. It's time that each accounting 
and auditing pronouncement be scrutinized to determine whether or not it 
should apply equally to public and non-public companies. 
Promulgating Auditing Standards—A Problem of Coordination 
Inherent in many APB announcements are a number of practical auditing 
and reporting problems. Even though the Committee on Auditing Procedure 
and the APB are both arms of the AICPA, there appear to be some coordination 
problems. When the APB's functions are taken over by the new Financial Ac-
counting Standards Board, a completely independent entity, the problems of 
coordination are likely to increase. 
Here are a few examples of the hot potatoes with which the Committee on 
Auditing Procedure has dealt in recent months. At least in some cases, the prob-
lems have been magnified by the APB's unwillingness to expand its general 
pronouncements by including more specifics. 
1. APB Opinion 20 prevents a change to a less preferable accounting 
method. This first raises the question as to what accounting method 
is preferable in a given situation. Furthermore, it places the auditor 
in a somewhat awkward posture when one client changes to a pre-
ferable method of accounting while another client, in identical cir-
cumstances, continues to use a less preferable method. The CPA 
must give a clean opinion to both clients so long as consistency is 
maintained by each. In effect, the CPA is expressing an opinion that 
the second client is reporting in a manner which is "consistently 
unpreferable." 
2. APB Opinion 18 prescribes the equity method for subsidiaries in 
which the parent owns 50% or less where the parent exercises "sig-
nificant influence." Here the APB has attempted to suggest a rea-
sonable guideline by stating that 20% or more ownership will nor-
mally be considered "significant." Auditors may expect considerable 
client pressure against the equity method when a 25%-owned sub-
sidiary loses money. On the other hand, contrary pressures may be 
expected when an 18%-owned subsidiary shows excellent earnings. 
3. Similar problems arise when consolidating financial statements. 
Where the subsidiary reports on a different fiscal year than the parent, 
which statements of the subsidiary should be consolidated with the 
parent? The SEC permits consolidation with subsidiary statements 
prepared within 93 days of the parent's closing date. The APB, how-
ever, has not been that specific. This leaves the auditor with a serious 
problem. Should the parent consolidate with audited financial state-
ments for the subsidiary (which statements could be as much as 
eleven months old) or should more current unaudited financial 
statements be used? 
Comfort Letters 
I had intended to report to you on an interview with an investment banker 
concerning comfort letters. However, his teeth were chattering so from the "cold 
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comfort" he's been receiving from auditors' comfort letters that I couldn't under-
stand him. Consequently, let me close with a few unusual applications of 
statistical sampling. 
Statistical Sampling 
I am told that a major life insurance company, seeking to speed up payment 
of death claims, decided to use a computerized statistical model to forecast when 
policyholders' claims would come due. In this way, the company hoped to 
virtually eliminate the need for filing claims. Those policyholders who received 
payments of "death" claims were somewhat startled and began to wonder 
whether the insurance company knew something they didn't know. However, 
few complaints were received from these policyholders. Major complaints came 
from widows who upon filing claims on the death of their spouses received a 
computer-produced form letter stating that their husbands were not "statistically 
dead." 
A large department store, seeking to speed up its monthly billing procedure, 
devised a computerized model of its business. Feeding in historical data con-
cerning the buying habits of each customer, the computer could then produce 
monthly bills without becoming bogged down by the need for posting each in-
dividual charge slip. Customers were merely billed an amount equal to their 
historical purchases for a given month. The store was finally forced to abandon 
the system, not because it received many complaints, but primarily because 
charge business tripled when details of the new system leaked out. Describing 
the experiment to his superiors, the innovative controller who had devised the 
new system said that he had good news and bad news. The good news: just as 
predicted by the system designer, even a tripling of charge business put no 
strain on the billing system. With no increase in office personnel whatsoever, 
the same bills were mailed monthly to charge customers as before the volume 
increase. The bad news: the department store was experiencing difficulty in 
paying its suppliers. The controller suggested that even this deficiency could be 
resolved if all suppliers would adopt the same billing system. 
Despite the difficulties experienced by these two companies, my partners 
and I decided to experiment with statistical sampling in our accounting practice. 
Other practitioners assured us that statistical sampling prevented over-auditing 
and provided, at the same time, an acceptable confidence level. We reasoned 
that if statistical sampling can work on a client-by-client basis, why not for our 
entire practice? Consequently, we now audit a meticulously selected random 
sample of our clientele, before rendering an opinion on all of our clients. Na-
turally, we bill all clients—to avoid any charge of unethical conduct. Let me now 
recall, as best I can, one final dream—really just a catnap—that occurred shortly 
after we adopted this new modern approach to auditing. 
As this dream opens, my six partners and I are standing before Judge Walter 
Mansfield just before sentencing. I never did hear the charge, only the jury's 
verdict. Oddly enough, the judge was dressed in the ceremonial robes normally 
worn by the Emperor of Japan and was singing an excerpt from the Mikado, 
one of my favorite Gilbert and Sullivan operettas. Translated into English, his 
song went something like this: 
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"My object all sublime, 
I shall achieve in time, 
To let the punishment fit the crime, 
The punishment fit the crime." 
With this brief preamble, the judge announced the sentence: the seven of 
us were to be arranged in random number order (using the last three digits of 
our respective social security numbers) before a firing squad of 21 guns. [I 
remember thinking what a shame that my first 21-gun salute was also to be my 
last.] Each gun, though equipped with six chambers, would contain but one 
bullet. In this way, the judge stated that he was "95% sure that 82% of us 
would survive—give or take 10%." 
As we were remanded to the sheriff's custody, the judge said that he would 
have acquitted us had the case been tried before him without a jury—a statement 
which relieved all seven of us greatly. 
In closing, I say to our chairman, the arranger of this excellent symposium, 
that I am delighted that he asked me to talk about problems, not solutions. And 
to all of you . . . pleasant dreams! 
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